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I. INTRODUCTION
In Abraham v. County of Hennepin,1 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that there exists a state constitutional right to a jury trial 
under both the Whistleblower Act2 and the Minnesota
Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA).3  The provision of 
the Minnesota Constitution upon which the court relied was Article 
I, Section 4, which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of 
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at 
† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002) [hereinafter Abraham II].
2. MINN. STAT. § 191.932, subd. 1(a) (2000).
3. MINN. STAT. § 182.654, subd. 9 (2000).
1
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law without regard to the amount in controversy.”4  In this essay I 
shall seek to identify and evaluate the method of constitutional 
interpretation the court used in arriving at its conclusion.
There are many ways of distinguishing and classifying methods 
of constitutional interpretation.  One of the standard approaches, 
the one I shall use here, distinguishes between originalist and non-
originalist methods.5  The basic recommendation of originalism is 
that in interpreting a written constitution, judges should restrict 
themselves to invoking principles and norms that are explicitly 
stated, or at least implicit in, the document itself.6  In contrast, 
nonoriginalist approaches maintain that it is legitimate, and
perhaps even necessary, for judges interpreting a written
constitution to invoke principles and norms from sources which 
have nothing to do with the language of the original document, the 
historical intentions motivating that language, the implicit
structure presupposed by the document, or the document’s
historical context.7  I shall refer to such sources as non-originalist
sources.  They might include a great variety of items, e.g., current 
systematic political philosophies (e.g., John Rawls8), ideologies of 
current political parties, prevailing attitudes in society, personal 
ideologies of judges, and so forth.
Of course, this way of contrasting the two approaches is very 
crude and overlooks a great many technical issues and distinctions 
(e.g., the existence of many distinct forms of both originalist and 
non-originalist approaches).9  But it will do for the purpose of this 
essay.  The fundamental contrast I am interested in is that between 
approaches which restrict themselves, in one way or another, to the 
historical document itself, as opposed to approaches which, in one 
way or another, refuse to so restrict themselves.
My objective is modest.  I shall make no effort to argue the 
merits of the controversy between proponents of originalist
methods and proponents of non-originalist methods.  Rather, I 
shall analyze the court’s opinion in terms of the contrast between 
the two methods of constitutional interpretation.  In particular, I 
shall argue (1) that in Abraham the court attempted to combine 
4. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
5. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5-
25 (2d ed. 2002), for a helpful overview of the distinction.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id.
8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
9. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, for an account of many of these varieties.
2
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these two methods; (2) that this effort was misguided because the 
methods are mutually incompatible; and (3) that, despite what the 
court said, its decision is best understood as the result of applying a 
non-originalist method.
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
David Abraham and Scott Lennander worked as offset
equipment operators in Hennepin County’s print shop.10  In 
February 1995 they complained to their supervisor, Theresa
Schaffer,11 about the air quality in the shop and stated that the 
fumes in the workplace were making them ill, causing them to have 
headaches, nausea, and difficulty breathing.12  A property
management worker informed Schaffer, Abraham, and Lennander 
that the shop ventilation system had been closed periodically for 
asbestos abatement work.13
On March 2, 1995, Abraham filed a written complaint with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Minnesota
Department of Labor and Industry (“Safety & Health Division), 
reporting the closed ventilation system and stating that employees 
of the county’s print shop believed that they were faced with an 
immediate health threat due to chemicals in the air.14  The 
complaint resulted in an unannounced MOSHA inspection of the 
shop on March 22, 1995.15
Abraham and Lennander’s co-worker, Michael Fishman,
claimed that he saw Lennander sprinkle chemicals on the print 
shop carpeting during the inspector’s visit.16  Fishman also claimed 
that he later saw Abraham wave a spray can in the air and heard 
him say, “Let’s get some fumes going in here.”17  Fishman reported 
these observations to other co-workers, and Schaffer eventually
10. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
11. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 622 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) [hereinafter Abraham I].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
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asked him about what he had seen and heard.18
Five days after the inspection, Abraham and Lennander were 
suspended.19  The county notified them four days later that their 
employment would be terminated on April 7, 1995, because they 
had tried to skew the results of the MOSHA inspection.20
Lennander was discharged for intentionally pouring chemicals on 
carpeting in the work area during the inspection, and Abraham was 
discharged for intentionally spraying chemicals into the air during 
the same inspection.21
B. Procedural History
Abraham and Lennander subsequently filed claims for
retaliatory discharge.22  They sued the county, alleging that their 
discharges violated the anti-reprisal provisions in MOSHA,23 the 
Whistleblower Act,24 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.25 26  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the county, dismissing 
all claims.27  Abraham and Lennander appealed only the dismissal 
of the MOSHA and whistleblower claims.28  The Minnesota Court 
of Appeals remanded the case and directed the district court to 
determine whether the county’s discharges were more likely than 
not motivated by retaliation, even if the county had a legitimate 
reason for the discharges.29
On remand, the district court ruled that MOSHA provided the 
exclusive remedy for alleged reprisals and dismissed the
whistleblower claim.30  Abraham and Lennander moved for a jury 
trial on the MOSHA claim.31  The district court denied this motion 
and conducted a bench trial.32  At the end of a two-week trial, the 




21. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
22. Id.
23. MINN. STAT. § 182.669 (1996).
24. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1996).
25. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1996).
26. Abraham I, supra note 11, at 124.
27. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 345.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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for intentionally introducing chemicals into their work area on the 
day of the inspection and that the county had not violated the 
MOSHA anti-reprisal law.33
After a second appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held 
that Abraham and Lennander were not entitled to a jury trial for 
either their claim under the Whistleblower Act or their claim under 
MOSHA.34  Distinguishing between “(1) actions at law from causes 
in equity, and (2) actions existing at the adoption of the
constitution from actions created later,”35 the court of appeals 
interpreted Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution as 
providing for a right to a jury trial in civil cases only for causes of 
action which are actions at law (i.e., actions for damages) and
which existed under the state of Minnesota law prevailing in 1857.36
Both conditions are necessary:
[T]he claim must be an action at law and must have 
existed when the state constitution was adopted.  The 
mere fact that a claim is solely for the recovery of money
will not suffice.  If that were the case, workers’
compensation claims and human rights act claims, being 
actions for the recovery of money, would carry a
constitutional entitlement to jury trial.  But because these 
actions did not exist when the constitution was adopted, 
they do not carry jury trial rights.37
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that, although claims for 
money damages bought under the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA 
qualify as actions at law, they are not entitled to jury trials under 
the Minnesota Constitution because they did not exist as part of the 
common law when the constitution was adopted.38  Importantly, the 
Legislature could have conferred a right to a jury trial in civil actions 
brought under the new statutes,39 but it chose not to do so. 
33. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 345.
34. Abraham I, supra note 11, at 129.
35. Id. at 125.
36. See id. at 125-26.
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 125.
5
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III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES IN THE MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT
Conceding that neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA 
provides for a statutory right to a jury trial, the appellants argued 
that they nevertheless had rights to jury trials under Article I, 
Section 4, of the Minnesota State Constitution because the actions 
they brought were  “legal in nature” and sought only the “recovery 
of money.”40  The appellants rejected any interpretation of Article I, 
Section 4’s phrase “cases at law” which would construe it as 
referring to the particular state of the common law existing in the 
Territory of Minnesota in 1857, the year in which the State
Constitution was adopted.  In short, they maintained that the jury 
trial provision of Article I, Section 4 should not be construed as 
providing for a constitutional right to a jury trial only for causes of 
action existing under Minnesota common law as of 1857.41  On the 
affirmative side, they argued that it ought to be read as providing 
for a right to a jury trial in any case which is “legal in nature,” 
whether or not a case of that kind could have been successfully 
brought in the Territory of Minnesota in 1857.42  According to the 
appellants, the only legally relevant question is whether such a case 
could be correctly categorized as being legal in nature and seeking 
only money damages under present Minnesota law.43
The county argued (1) that neither the Whistleblower Act nor 
MOSHA explicitly provides for a right to a jury trial; and (2) that 
there is no state constitutional right to a jury trial under either 
statute because neither statutory cause of action existed in 1857 
when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted.44  More broadly, 
with respect to (2), the county argued that in 1857 there was no 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against
employers and that, in any case, in 1857 the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity shielded municipalities from actions of any kind,
including, but not limited to, actions for wrongful discharge.45
40. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.
41. Id. at 349.
42. Id.
43. Abraham I, supra note 11, at 125.
44. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.
45. Id.
6
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING
A. Framing of the Issue
As the court saw it, the issue was “whether Article I, Section 4 
of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury 
in an action, such as this, in which an employee seeks only money 
damages for retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of 
the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA,”46 where Article I, Section 4 
provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in 
controversy.”47
Why did the court regard this as the issue?  Because the 
appellants had demanded a jury trial and since neither the
Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA explicitly provides for a right to a 
jury trial, “that right, if it exists, must arise under the
constitution.”48  In this regard, the court obviously presupposed the 
existence of only two possible legal sources for a right to a jury trial 
under Minnesota law: State statutes, on the one hand, and the State 
Constitution, on the other.49  Thus, the court apparently did not 
think that it would be permissible for Minnesota courts to extract a 
right to a jury trial from common law principles which were not 
themselves grounded in the Constitution.
B. Interpretation of Minnesota Constitution Article I, Section 4
What did the court take to be the intended meaning of Article 
I, Section 4?  In answering that question, I shall follow closely the 
court’s own sequence of analysis.
The court began by noting that its prior decisions have
“consistently acknowledged the distinction between actions at law,
for which the constitution guarantees a right to jury trial, and 
actions in equity, for which there is no constitutional right to jury 
trial.”50  Thus, it seems clear that the court agreed with the court of 
appeals on at least the proposition that a necessary condition for 





50. Id. at 349.
7
Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC 10/28/2002 10:42 PM
272 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
a claim at law for money damages.  That is, it appears that the court 
agreed with the first of the two necessary (and together sufficient) 
conditions for a constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil case 
specified by the court of appeals.
But what about the court of appeals’ second condition,
namely, that a constitutional right to a jury trial exists only for 
common-law actions which existed under Minnesota law as of 1857?
On the one hand, it might well seem that the court agreed.  For, it 
said that this provision “was intended to continue, unimpaired and 
inviolate, the right to trial by jury as it existed in the Territory of 
Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857.”51  Standing 
alone, that sentence appears to adopt the court of appeals’ second 
condition.
On the other hand, however, the rest of the court’s discussion 
strongly suggests that, whatever the court itself may have intended 
by that sentence, it certainly did not mean what the court of 
Appeals would have meant had it used those words.  As the court 
explained:
[T]his court has not held that only those causes of action 
that were identified in 1857 as causes of action at law carry 
today an attendant right to jury trial.  Rather, the
constitutional right exists for the same type of action for 
which a jury trial existed when the constitution was
adopted, any cause of action at law.  The constitution is 
not frozen in time in 1857, incapable of application to the 
law as it evolves.  The nature and character of the
controversy, as determined from all the pleadings and by 
the relief sought, determines whether the cause of action 
is one at law today, and thus carries an attendant
constitutional right to jury trial.52
But what precisely does this mean?  Fully grasping the court’s 
intended sense requires a close examination of the way in which 
the court applied these words to its own precedents and to the 
Abraham litigation.
One of its precedents the court examined was Olson v.
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc.,53 a case in which it had 
ruled that a party bringing a claim for promissory estoppel has no 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  In Abraham the court said that it 
51. Id. at 348.
52. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
53. 628 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 2001).
8
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had ruled as it had in Olson because the action brought there was 
an equitable, rather than a legal, claim.54  In particular, the court 
observed that it
traced the historical progression of promissory estoppel 
not to determine whether promissory estoppel was a cause 
of action at law in 1857, but only to determine whether 
promissory estoppel evolved in Minnesota as an equitable 
or legal cause of action, and therefore whether promissory 
estoppel is a cause of action at law or a cause of action in 
equity in Minnesota today, for in different jurisdictions the 
cause of action for promissory estoppel evolved
differently,55
and that it had concluded that “in Minnesota promissory estoppel
evolved as an equitable action, for which there is no right to trial by 
jury.”56
In resolving the question whether there is a constitutional 
right to a jury trial with respect to any particular claim, the court 
said that it must “examine the nature and character of the
controversy . . . as determined from the pleadings and by the relief 
sought.”57
1. Common Law Precedent
Turning to the statutory claims brought in Abraham, the court 
characterized them as “a species of the common law action of 
wrongful discharge.”58 It then turned to a historical analysis of the 
evolution of that common law action.  By way of prefatory
comment, the court said that such a historical examination is not 
required to look back to 1857 in order to decide “whether wrongful 
discharge existed then as a cause of action at law.”59  Rather,  “we 
need only determine whether a claim for wrongful discharge
seeking only money damages is an action at law or an equitable 
action.”60  In making that determination, the sole question is
whether a cause of action for wrongful discharge seeking only 
money damages has now evolved into an action at law.61









Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC 10/28/2002 10:42 PM
274 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
The court then traced the evolution of the cause of action for 
wrongful discharge back to an 1861 case, Mackubin v. Clarkson,62 in 
which the court had ruled that an employee could bring a breach-
of-contract action for damages for wrongful termination.63  Citing a 
series of later breach-of-contract cases, the court said, “[a]s contract
actions brought in a court of law for money damages, claims for 
wrongful discharge were causes of action at law, and they were 
consequently tried to juries.”64  Of course, even conceding that this 
line of cases can be traced back to 1861 (and notice that 1861 
comes after 1857, the latter of which might well be regarded as the 
legally relevant year) would not, by itself, help the cause of the 
Abraham appellants.  They had not brought breach-of-contract
claims, but rather statutory claims.
The court then discussed the origin and evolution of the 
doctrine that “absent an employment contract for a specified term, 
employment is ‘at-will,’ meaning either the employee or the
employer may end the employment relationship at any time for any 
reason.”65  The at-will doctrine was applied in the 1936 case of 
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.66  Now, at first glance, it might well 
seem that the at-will doctrine advances the appellants’ cause no 
further than did the earlier line of breach-of-contract cases, which 
is to say, not at all.  For, at least prima facie, absent statutory 
protection against retaliatory discharge, the appellants would have 
had no cause of action at all, much less a cause of action at law.
However, the court went on to observe that “the common law 
doctrine of employment has been narrowed in the 66 years since 
Skagerberg” and that “[i]n many jurisdictions, courts have
recognized an exception to the doctrine of employment at will, 
allowing a cause of action when the employee is wrongfully
discharged.”67  With respect to more recent developments in
Minnesota, in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.,68 the court of 
appeals ruled that there exists an exception to the at-will doctrine 
when an employee is terminated for refusing to engage in unlawful 
62. 5 Minn. 247 (1861).
63. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 350.
64. Id. at 351.
65. Id.
66. 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936).
67. Id.
68. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986), aff’g 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986).
10
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conduct.69  After the supreme court granted review, but before 
publication of its decision, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the 
Whistleblower Act.70  The Abraham court said that at that point it no 
longer had to decide the general policy question whether the State 
of Minnesota should follow those states that had recognized a 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.71  However, 
since the Phipps employee had been terminated prior to the 
effective date of the Whistleblower Act, the latter statute could not 
ground his claim.72  Hence, according to the Abraham court’s 
analysis, it was compelled to decide whether that particular plaintiff 
could proceed at common law.73  The court said that it “allowed the
employee to pursue his common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge, and . . . agreed that the common law protects those fired 
for their refusal to violate the law.”74  Thus, the Abraham court 
apparently committed itself to the proposition that, immediately
prior to the effective date of the Whistleblower Act, employees who 
were terminated for refusing to violate the law had a common law 
cause of action at law for retaliatory discharge under Minnesota 
law.75
2. Statutory Claims
Having completed its overview of the development of the 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in Minnesota, 
the court turned to an analysis of the statutory claims brought by 
the appellants,76 remarking that “[w]hile the causes of action 
before us are statutory claims for wrongful discharge, our analysis 
of the right to jury trial remains the same: are these claims for 
retaliatory discharge seeking only money damages causes of action 
at law?”77
69. Id.
70. Id. at 351-52.




75. Id. However, note that the court also confusingly stated, “Because of the 
enactment of the Whistleblower Act, we acknowledged in Phipps that we did not 
have to resolve the policy question whether Minnesota should recognize a
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.” Id.  Perhaps it means to say 
that although it did not have to resolve the question, it did so anyway.  Presumably,
the court of appeals was puzzled as well. See Abraham I, supra note 11, at 127.
76. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 352.
77. Id.
11
Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC 10/28/2002 10:42 PM
276 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
In that regard, the court first characterized a claim for
wrongful discharge as a “tort” claim.78  After observing that a 
retaliatory discharge claim is one kind of wrongful discharge claim, 
the court concluded that “[a] whistleblower claim that arises from 
alleged retaliatory conduct by the employer intended to injure the 
employee for engaging in lawful conduct or for reporting unlawful 
conduct . . . is a tort.”79  The court also noted that not only is a 
retaliatory discharge claim a tort claim, but it is also a claim “for 
which the law recognizes a right to consequential money damages
in an action in district court.”80  In sum, as “a tort action seeking 
only money damages in a district court,” a retaliatory discharge 
claim is “a cause of action at law.”81
Applying these general principles to the Abraham claims, the 
court characterized them as “tort claims, brought in the district 
court, seeking only consequential money damages,” and concluded 
that “the nature and character of the controversy support the 
conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only money damages 
is an action at law.”82
3. Theory of Relief
The court next turned to the question of the “theory of relief” 
upon which the appellants’ claims were based.83  It observed that, 
according to its own precedents, seeking monetary relief is not by 
itself a sufficient condition for a constitutional right to a jury trial.84
For example, in Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten
Transportation, Inc.,85 the court had refused to recognize a
constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to actions for specific 
performance seeking money damages as part of the equitable relief 
requested, as contrasted with actions seeking money damages for 
breach of contract.86  Thus, whereas claims for money damages are 
usually classifiable as legal claims, the court said that it would not 
permit a litigant to “cloak or disguise an equitable action simply by 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 352-53.





85. 268 Minn. 176, 128 N.W.2d 334 (1964).
86. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 353.
12
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its prayer for relief.”87
However, despite the fact that seeking money damages is not 
by itself sufficient to guarantee a right to a jury trial, it is
nonetheless an important factor in the inquiry whether a particular 
claim is legal or equitable in nature.88  In that regard, the court 
said, “because we look to the nature and character of the
controversy as determined from all the pleadings, including the 
relief sought, the nature of the relief sought is important in 
determining whether a claim is legal or equitable, and as noted, 
claims for consequential money damages are typically legal
claims.”89 Thus, since the Abraham appellants did not seek equitable 
relief under either the Whistleblower Act or MOSHA, but only 
money damages, the court’s examination of the relief sought “. . .
supports the conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only 
money damages is an action at law.”90
The court then addressed its rulings in Breimhorst v. Beckman91
and Ewert v. City of Winthrop.92  With respect to Breimhorst, the 
supreme court said that its analysis in the Abraham case was not 
altered by that earlier holding.
In Breimhorst, we recognized that the legislature abolished 
a common law cause of action for an employee injured on 
the job, replacing it with a remedy under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, a statutory remedy that was new,
adequate, and fundamentally different from the common law 
cause of action. The legislature took the cause of action 
out of the district court and placed it in a quasi-judicial
forum. We concluded that when the legislature abolished 
a common law cause of action and substituted a remedy 
that was new, adequate, and fundamentally different from 
that which was provided at common law, there was no 
constitutional right to a jury. We did not hold in Breimhorst
that the legislature could deny the constitutional right to 
jury trial when it codifies, creates, or modifies a cause of 
action at law.93





91. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
92. 278 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1979).
93. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 353-54.
13
Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC 10/28/2002 10:42 PM
278 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
In Ewert, we held that the Minnesota Constitution does 
not provide the right to trial by jury to one who appeals a 
special assessment.  We stated that the right to appeal a 
special assessment arises exclusively from statute and does 
not exist at common law, and as such, there is no
attendant right to jury trial in appeals from special
assessments.  We did not hold in Ewert that all statutory 
causes of action are equitable actions with no right to jury 
trial.  When a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, it 
falls within the parameters of those ‘cases at law’ for which 
there is a constitutional right to jury trial.94
The court went on to reaffirm earlier decisions, holding that, 
although the legislature may expand the right to a jury trial beyond 
the scope of the constitutional guarantee, it may not eliminate the 
constitutional right to a jury trial “merely by codifying or modifying 
a common law cause of action.”95
By way of clarification, the court noted that:
To the extent that we suggested in Breimhorst that the
legislature may limit the constitutional right to a jury by 
simply codifying or modifying a common law cause of 
action, and to the extent that we suggested in Ewert that a 
statutory cause of action may never carry a constitutional 
right to jury trial, we clarify today that the right to a jury 
trial applies to all causes of action at law, regardless of 
whether the legislature has codified the cause of action.96
The court concluded by holding that a retaliatory-discharge
action brought under the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA and 
seeking only money damages is a cause of action at law for which 
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial.97
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S HOLDING
A. Structure
This section details the essential structure of the court’s
analysis.  I am not certain that my analysis matches exactly what the 
court had in mind, but at the very least, it seems to be a plausible 
interpretation of the decision.
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Suppose that C is a statutory cause of action brought pursuant 
to a Minnesota statute S.  Suppose further that S does not provide 
for a right to a jury trial.  The question is whether a litigant who 
brings C nonetheless has a right to a jury trial under the Minnesota 
Constitution.  I propose that the essence of the court’s analysis can 
be adequately formulated in terms of the following series of
questions and answers:
[1] What is the ultimate legal question?
[a] The ultimate legal question is whether C would be 
currently classified as a cause of action at law under 
present Minnesota law.  If so, then C is protected by a 
constitutional right to a jury trial.
[2] Thus, are we to understand that it is not legally relevant 
that C may not have itself existed as a cause of action under 
Minnesota law in 1857?
[a]  That is correct.
[3] Upon what aspects or elements of the lawsuit in which C is 
asserted should a court focus its attention in order to 
determine whether C would be currently classified as a 
cause of action at law under present Minnesota law?
[a] The court should examine (1) the “nature and
character of the controversy” and (2) the “relief
sought.”
[4] With respect to the relief sought:
[a] Is seeking money damages a necessary condition for 
being constitutionally entitled to a jury trial?
{1}Yes.
[b] Is seeking money damages a sufficient condition for 
being constitutionally entitled to a jury trial?
{1}No. A request for money damages which is
15
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incorporated in a more comprehensive claim for 
equitable relief would not be constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial.  The claim for relief must be 
solely a claim for money damages.
[5] With respect to the nature and character of the
controversy:
[a] Does it matter that C is a statutory cause of action, as 
opposed to a common-law cause of action?  In other 
words, is it only common-law causes of action which are 
constitutionally guaranteed jury trials?
{1}No. Being a statutory cause of action is not a fatal 
defect.
[b] Is it necessary that C, along with its authorizing statute 
S, existed under Minnesota law in 1857, the date the 
Minnesota Constitution was adopted?
{1} No.
[c] Does that mean that any statutory cause of action, qua
statutory cause of action,  carries with it a constitutional 
right to a jury trial?
{1} No.
[d]What then is the criterion for identifying those
statutory causes of action for which there is a
constitutional right to a jury trial?
{1}A statutory cause of action is protected by a
constitutional right to a jury trial if and only if:
{a} that statutory cause of action merely codified or 
modified a pre-existing common-law cause of
action, as opposed to  creating a statutory cause 
of action which was new or fundamentally different
from any common-law cause of action existing at 
the time of the statute’s enactment;
16
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{b} that pre-existing common-law cause of action 
possessed the following legal attributes:
<1> It was, immediately prior to its
transformation into a statutory cause of
action, classifiable as an action at law; and
<2> It had, by the time of its transformation into 
statutory form, evolved, by means judicial
interpretive expansion, from a common-law
root,98 an action at law that existed under 
Minnesota law as of 1857.
[e] Is it necessary for the statutory cause of action to be a 
recognizable version of the common-law root, as the 
latter existed in 1857?
{1} No.  All that is necessary is that the common-law
root eventually evolved, through judicial
interpretive expansion, into a common-law derivative99
that can be recognized in the statutory cause of 
action.
[f] What is an example of a statutory cause of action that 
created a cause of action which was new or
fundamentally different from any common-law cause of 
action existing at the time of the statute’s enactment?
{1}The statutory creation of an employee’s remedies 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.100
98. This is my term, not the court’s.  I use it because it illuminates the court’s 
conception.
99. Again, this is my term, not the court’s.
100. It should be noted that this analytic outline does not account for every 
aspect of the court’s discussion.  For example, I have omitted any reference to the 
possibility of a statute “creating” a common-law cause of action, as in “codifies, 
creates, or modifies a cause of action at law.” Abraham II, supra note 1, at 354.  It 
seems to me that the concept of a statutory cause of action being itself a common-
law cause of action is self-contradictory.  I assume that the court did not intend to 
say that, but what it did mean is not clear to me.  In any case, it seems to me that 
the court’s point can be adequately expressed with just the verbs “codifies” and 
“modifies” alone.
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B. Underlying Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
What is the nature of the underlying method of constitutional 
interpretation the court applied in Abraham?  In particular, is it an 
application of an originalist method or a non-originalist method?
On the one hand, at the beginning of its discussion the court 
offered a remark that, if considered by itself, strongly suggests an 
originalist approach.  With respect to the jury-trial provision of the 
Minnesota Constitution, the court said, “[t]his provision is
intended to continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial 
by jury as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our
constitution was adopted in 1857.”101  There are at least two reasons 
for thinking that this assertion suggests the invocation of an
originalist method.
First, the assertion focuses upon the state of Minnesota law in 
1857, the year in which the Minnesota Constitution was adopted.  It 
would be odd for any full-blooded use of a non-originalist method 
to pay attention to the historical context of a constitution.  For, that 
would suggest that the primary question is, “What did the
Constitution mean then?”  Presumably, for a non-originalist the 
primary question is rather, “What does the living Constitution mean 
now?,” where it is implicitly presupposed that this latter question 
must be answered by looking to what I have called non-originalist
sources, that is, sources other than the original document, its 
intentions, structure, or historical context.
Second, the court used the verb “is intended” in referring to 
the constitutional provision in question.  The use of that verb also 
suggests the implicit invocation of an originalist approach insofar 
as it draws the reader’s attention to the historical intentions
motivating the provision.  Presumably, non-originalists would not 
be especially concerned with what the historical intentions
motivating any particular constitutional provision may or may not 
have been.
In sharp contrast, the reader is presumably startled to
encounter these words just a few lines later:
This court has not held that only those causes of action 
that were identified in 1857 as causes of action at law carry 
today an attendant right to jury trial.  Rather, the
constitutional right exists for the same type of action for 
which a jury trial existed when the constitution was
101. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.
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adopted, any cause of action at law.  The constitution is 
not frozen in time in 1857, incapable of application to the 
law as it evolves. The nature and character of the
controversy, as determined from all the pleadings and by 
the relief sought, determines whether the cause of action 
is one at law today, and thus carries an attendant
constitutional right to jury trial.102
Whatever this language suggests, it certainly does not suggest 
an originalist method of constitutional interpretation.  Rather, it is 
a paradigm of non-originalist language.  Here we see the familiar 
non-originalist concept of a “living” constitution, with all its
attendant characteristics.  The court might well have quoted Justice 
William Brennan’s well-known remarks in this regard:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way 
that we can: as Twentieth-Century Americans.  We look to 
the history of the time of framing and to the intervening 
history of interpretation.  But the ultimate question must 
be, what do the words of the text mean in our time?  For 
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and 
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope 
with current problems and current needs.  What the 
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other 
times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time.103
C. Originalism v. Non-Originalism
According to the originalist conception, a constitution is (1) a 
set of legal principles, which are (2) expressed in terms of
particular sentences, that, in turn, are (3) contained in a particular 
historical document, and (4) whose semantical meanings are
functions of the particular historical context in which that
document was adopted, including at the very least the particular 
intentions of those responsible for choosing those particular
sentences to express those intentions.104
On the other hand, according to the non-originalist approach, 
a constitution is not a historically rooted and historically expressed 
set of legal principles.  It is rather conceived of primarily as
102. Id.
103. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT, 23, 27 (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1990).
104. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 17-18.
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whatever set of principles a particular group of persons (namely, 
the final court in the jurisdiction) happens to presently select as 
the constraints that, as a matter of contemporary political and 
philosophical considerations, ought to be imposed upon
governmental power.  Indeed, there is an important sense in which 
non-originalists do not think of a constitution as a set of principles at 
all.  Rather, it is thought of primarily as a particular set of persons 
who have been presently assigned the legal power to tell society 
what “constitutional law” now requires.
Obviously, these two approaches result in dramatically
different conceptions of what it means for a society to follow the 
Rule of Law.  Originalist methods are essentially tied to the idea that 
a sophisticated legal system typically operates in distinct stages (at 
least on the constitutional and statutory levels): (1) rule formation 
and enactment by the people or their representatives; (2) rule 
interpretation and application by the courts; and (3) rule
enforcement by the executive agency.  In contrast, non-originalist
methods tend to think of rules of law as continually in the process 
of creation, where that creative process is ultimately in the hands of 
judges.  In other words, such methods tend to collapse the first two 
stages of the originalist analysis and commit both to the ultimate 
power of the courts.  This is essentially the legal-realist conception 
of legal rules, famously articulated by Holmes.105  There is no legal 
rule at all until some particular court declares: “This is what the 
rule is here.”
One of the consequences of using a non-originalist method of 
constitutional interpretation is the availability of two methods of 
amending a constitution.  On the one hand, there is the method of 
following the explicit provisions governing the process of formal 
amendment contained in the document itself.  On the other hand, 
there is the method of amending the constitution by the judicial 
techniques of non-originalist interpretation.  Indeed, one of the 
primary arguments offered in support of non-originalist
interpretative methods is the relative difficulty of formally
amending constitutions, as compared with the relative ease of 
amending them by non-originalist judicial methods.106  In fact, once 
permitting oneself the use of non-originalist judicial amendment of 
the original document, there would presumably be little or no 
105. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897).
106. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 23.
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point in ever invoking the formal procedural apparatus of formal 
amendment by the people.
Thus, there is at least a prima facie appearance that in Abraham
the court tried to simultaneously use both originalist and non-
originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, an attempt 
which seems self-inconsistent in light of the fact that originalist and 
non-originalist approaches are typically defined as being mutually 
exclusive.  However, some might wonder whether this prima facie
appearance is only an appearance, one which could be dispelled by 
a closer examination.  There are at least two ways in which one 
might think the appearance of logical incoherence could be
dispelled.
First, one might suppose that the court interpreted the jury-
trial provision as having originally been intended to state something
like this: “We, the framers of this constitutional provision, hereby 
declare the existence of a constitutional right to a jury trial with 
respect to any cause of action, whether existing now in 1857 or 
later, upon which any subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court shall 
decide to confer a constitutional right to a jury trial.”  If the court 
had so interpreted the jury-trial provision, then there would be no 
appearance of incoherence in its analysis.  For, that analysis could 
then be interpreted as not invoking any non-originalist method at 
all, but rather as straightforwardly invoking only an originalist
method.  A court which simply follows original directions of the 
framers to “make things up as you go along” could not be justifiably 
accused of resorting to non-originalist methods.  By definition, 
non-originalist methods look to interpretive sources distinct from 
and independent of the original document itself.  Under the
contemplated hypothesis, that could not be said of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.
There are only two problems with that hypothesis.  First, it 
seems unlikely that the framers of any constitution would have 
drafted a provision with anything even approximating such an 
open-ended unlimited intent.  Indeed, it seems rather that if that 
were the mutual intention of the participants in a constitutional 
convention, they would not have even bothered to draft any
provision concerning the issue at all.  What would be the point of 
drafting a provision whose intended meaning is: “By the way, with 
respect to this issue, you can do anything you want”? The basic 
motivation for adopting a constitution at all is to limit and constrain
all present and subsequent governmental agencies, including the 
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courts.  If one has decided ahead of time to allow any and all 
subsequent judicial interpretations of the constitutional document 
to stand, one might as well save the time and trouble of even 
committing the constitution to paper.  The second problem is that 
there seems to be nothing in the court’s discussion which even 
remotely suggests that it intended to adopt such an interpretation 
of the jury-trial provision.
The second way in which one might consider trying to avoid 
interpreting the court’s opinion as internally inconsistent is to 
suppose that the court interpreted the jury-trial provision as having 
been originally intended to state something like this: “We, the 
framers of this constitutional provision, hereby declare the
existence of a constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to any 
cause of action, whether existing now in 1857 or later, which seeks 
money damages as the sole relief.”
Unlike the first suggested interpretation of the jury-trial
provision, this interpretation is perhaps at least prima facie
historically plausible.  But the difficulty is that there is nothing in 
the court’s discussion in Abraham which suggests that it construed 
the provision in this way.  On the contrary, there is much
suggesting just the opposite.  After all, if it had construed the 
provision in this second suggested way, its analysis could have been 
adequately expressed in just three sentences: “(1)  The
constitutional jury-trial provision provides that any cause of action 
seeking only money damages is protected by a constitutional right 
to a jury trial.  (2)  This statutory cause of action seeks only money 
damages.  (3) Hence, this statutory cause of action is protected by a 
constitutional right to a jury trial.”  The fact that the court did not 
so express itself strongly suggests that it had no such intention.
D. Incompatibility of the Two Approaches
So, what do we have?  It seems that we have a judicial opinion 
trying to have it both ways.  Readers might ask, “But so what?”  They 
might continue by objecting, “You earlier asserted that any
simultaneous use of originalist and non-originalist methods of 
constitutional interpretation is logically incoherent.  But I’m not 
convinced.  Why can’t courts coherently use both methods at the 
same time?”
I would respond in the following way: these two methods of 
interpretation are indeed incompatible.  The prima facie
appearance of compatibility is primarily caused by the sociological
22
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fact that courts often describe themselves as resolving constitutional 
issues by simultaneously examining both the original intent
motivating the constitutional document itself, on the one hand, 
and contemporary non-originalist considerations, on the other, 
and they often expressly deny that the simultaneous use of both 
methods involves any logical inconsistency.  But despite this, I 
would maintain that the two methods really are incompatible on 
the basis of this argument: [1] In the event of a conflict between 
the historical intention motivating a particular constitutional
provision, on the one hand, and contemporary non-originalist
considerations, on the other, there are only two alternatives. [2] 
On the one hand, courts can permit the contemporary non-
originalist considerations to override the historical considerations. 
[3] On the other hand, courts can permit the historical
considerations to override the contemporary non-originalist
considerations. [4] But the first alternative is essentially equivalent 
to a non-originalist approach, whereas the second alternative is 
essentially equivalent to an originalist approach. [5] Hence, the two 
approaches are mutually incompatible.  In the event of a conflict, 
courts are logically compelled to choose between them.
E. Non-Originalism Applied
Assuming that I am right about the mutual incompatibility of 
originalist and non-originalist methods of constitutional
interpretation, the only remaining question I shall take up is, 
“Which of these alternatives did the court choose to apply in 
Abraham?”
I have interpreted the court’s opinion as trying to
simultaneously have it both ways and have quoted two passages in 
support of my interpretation—one strongly suggesting the use of 
an originalist method, the other strongly suggesting the use of a 
non-originalist method.  Additional support which could be offered 
for my interpretation is the court’s use of an historical test in 
resolving the constitutional issue before it.  By tracing in elaborate 
scholarly detail the “evolution” of the common-law root of breach-
of-contract causes of action against employers legally available in 
1857 down through the common-law derivative of retaliatory-
dismissal causes of action legally available immediately prior to the 
enactment of the Whistleblower Act in 1987 and, from there, down 
to the ultimate statutory codification or modification of that
derivative by the Whistleblower Act, the court presumably sought to
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convey the idea that it was simultaneously relying upon both
originalist and non-originalist methods.
But if the simultaneous use of both originalist and non-
originalist methods is logically inconsistent, then it presumably 
follows that, if the court’s analysis in Abraham is to be construed as 
logically coherent, it must be construed as selecting one or the 
other of these two methods, but not both.  I shall argue that its 
opinion is most plausibly construed as applying a non-originalist
method.
Here is an argument supporting that interpretation: [1] Any 
originalist method of constitutional interpretation imposes
significant limitations upon the class of possible interpretations of 
the provision in question. [2] The court’s historical test does not 
impose significant limitations upon the class of possible
interpretations of the provision in question. [3] Hence, the court’s 
historical test is not an originalist method of constitutional
interpretation.  I shall refer to this argument as Argument A.
The argument is deductively valid.  Hence, the only relevant 
question is whether its premises are true.  I will not offer any 
argument for premise [1]; its truth seems obvious, at least to me.
This point about obviousness can be put in another way: If [1] is 
false then there simply are no originalist methods of constitutional 
interpretation at all.  That leaves the question of premise [2]’s 
truth-value.
I propose that [2] can be supported by focusing once more 
upon the court’s historical test for identifying those statutory causes 
of action for which there exists a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Recall the essence of that test: Any presently existing Minnesota 
statutory cause of action “S” is protected by a constitutional right to 
a jury trial if and only if [1] in 1857 there existed a Minnesota 
common-law cause of action “C” (the common-law “root”) with 
respect to which there was in 1857 a constitutional right to a jury 
trial, which [2] eventually evolved by means of judicial
interpretation into a Minnesota common-law cause of action “C*” 
(the common-law “derivative”), which, in turn, [3] was eventually
“codified” or “modified” by a statute S, as opposed to being
“replaced” by S.
So, what is the problem?  I suggest the problem is this test can 
apparently be used to prove that any statutory cause of action 
carries with it a constitutional right to a jury trial.  In general, given 
any common-law cause of action existing in 1857, one can, with 
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sufficient ingenuity, link it with any statutory cause of action.  There 
are at least two reasons for so thinking.  The court’s test possesses
two features which give it indefinitely large degrees of flexibility.
One of those features concerns the purported relationship 
between two causes of action, the 1857 cause of action I have been 
referring to as the common-law root, C, on the one hand, and the 
later cause of action I have been referring to as the common-law
derivative, C*, on the other.  The underlying jurisprudential
question is, “Under what circumstances is a later cause of action 
(here, C*) merely an evolutionary modification of an earlier cause 
of action (here, C), as opposed to simply being a different cause of 
action altogether?”  The corresponding underlying jurisprudential 
problem is that, while the earlier cases exemplifying C will
inevitably share some legal features with the later cases
exemplifying C*, they will not share others.  Hence, by selectively 
describing the characteristics the two lines of cases share, one can 
make it look as if C* really is just a later evolutionary stage of C.
On the other hand, by emphasizing the characteristics the two sets 
of cases fail to share, one can also make it look as if C* is not a later 
evolutionary stage of C at all, but rather a different cause of action 
altogether.
The availability of this flexibility can be illustrated in terms of 
the court’s own discussion in Abraham.  The court’s purported 
common-law root was first exemplified in Mackubin v. Clarkson107 in 
1861.  Its purported common-law derivative was exemplified in 
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.108 in 1986.  On the one hand, it 
is possible to describe these two cases as cases in which an
employee sues its employer for money damages for a wrongful 
termination.  Using that level of semantic generality, it is easy to 
make it look as if the cause of action exemplified in Phipps is merely 
a later stage of the cause of action exemplified in Mackubin.
On the other hand, it is also possible to describe these two 
cases in a very different way.  One can characterize Mackubin as a 
case in which an employee sues his private employer for money 
damages for a wrongful termination on a breach-of-contract theory, 
at a time when the rule of sovereign immunity precludes public 
employees from suing their employers,109 and at a time when 
107. 5 Minn. 247 (1861).
108. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986).
109. The doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to tort liability was 
judicially abrogated in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 188 
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private employees who are not parties to employment contracts are 
at the mercy of the employment-at-will doctrine.  On the other 
hand, one can characterize Phipps as a case in which an employee 
sues a private employer for money damages for a wrongful
termination, where the employee does not have to rely upon a 
breach-of-contract theory because of the earlier demise of the at-
will doctrine, and where, although the employee happens to sue a 
private employer, he could have also sued a public employer, were
he employed by one, because of the earlier demise of the
sovereign-immunity doctrine.  Thus, using this more specific level 
of semantic generality, it is possible to make it look as though the 
cause of action exemplified in Phipps is not a later stage of the 
cause of action exemplified in Mackubin at all, but rather a new and 
different cause of action.
I said earlier that the court’s historical test possesses two
features which give it indefinitely large degrees of flexibility.  The 
second feature concerns the relationship between the purported 
common-law derivative C* and S, the purported statutory
codification or modification of C* (as opposed to the
“replacement” of C*).
The underlying jurisprudential problem in this context is the 
same as the just-discussed problem concerning the relationship 
between C and C*, namely, the availability of varying levels of 
semantic description.  On the one hand, it is possible to
characterize C* and S so as to make it look as if S is merely a 
“codification” or “modification” of C*, as opposed to being a 
“replacement” of C*.  On the other hand, it is also possible to 
characterize C* and S so as to make it look as if S is a replacement 
of C*.  At least one reason for thinking so is that any common law 
cause of action shares at least one legal characteristic with any 
statutory cause of action, on the one hand, and differs from that 
statutory cause of action with at least one other  characteristic, on 
the other.  Given this general fact, by focusing upon one or the 
other of these characteristics it is possible to characterize the 
relation between C* and S either as a mere “codification” or 
“modification”, on the one hand, or as a “replacement,” on the 
other.
The availability of these two alternatives can be illustrated in 
N.W.2d 795 (1962).  For the subsequent legislative abrogation, see MINN. STAT. § 
3.736 (2000).
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terms of the court’s own discussion.  Let Phipps be the purported 
common-law derivative C* and the Whistleblower Act be C*’s 
purported statutory codification, S.  By suitably describing Phipps
and the Whistleblower Act, one can make it look as if the latter is
merely a codification or modification of Phipps.
For example, it is possible to describe the cause of action 
exemplified in Phipps as suing one’s employer for money damages for a 
wrongful termination, on the one hand, and to describe the cause of 
action exemplified in the Whistleblower Act as suing one’s employer 
for money damages for wrongful termination, on the other.
Characterizing the two causes of action at this level of semantic 
generality makes it look as if S is merely a codification or
modification of C*.
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the cause of 
action exemplified in Phipps as suing one’s employer for money damages 
for a wrongful termination, where the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial,
on the one hand, and the cause of action exemplified in the 
Whistleblower Act as suing one’s employer for money damages for a 
wrongful termination, where the plaintiff has no right to a jury trial, on 
the other.  Describing the two causes of action at this level of 
semantic generality makes it look as if S is not a codification or 
modification of C*, but rather a replacement.
It might be argued in defense of the court’s distinction
between codification/modification, on the one hand, and
replacement, on the other, that if some particular statute goes “too 
far” it would be obvious to the court and to everyone else that the 
statute was a replacement, rather than a codification/modification.
It might be argued that in such a case the court would hold the 
line.
But perhaps not.  In support of such a doubt, one could 
mention the court’s own ruling in Breimhorst v. Beckman110 that the 
Workers’ Compensation Act111 was a “replacement” of the common-
law cause of action employees had against their employers for 
personal injuries, rather than a mere “codification/modification”
of that cause of action.  Now, as the court itself emphasized in 
Abraham, the Workers’ Compensation Act substituted an
administrative process for a judicial process.  That seems to have 
been a very radical change.  But consider the following possibility.
110. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
111. See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.01-.81 (1949).
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Suppose that the Minnesota Legislature were to substitute
administrative proceedings without juries for all common-law tort 
and breach-of-contract actions.  Such a legislative action would 
seem to come pretty close to a total elimination of jury trials in civil 
actions.  It seems easy to imagine, the court being so distressed by 
that elimination that it would find some way to tie that hypothetical 
statute to some common-law root and common-law derivative.  If so, 
so much the worse for the line the court drew in Breimhorst.
Thus, it seems that the court’s historical test does not provide 
any significant degree of restriction upon the class of possible 
constitutional interpretations.  Consequently, the conclusion of 
Argument A—that the court’s historical test is not an originalist 
test—seems to have been established.
Indeed, given what the court said in Abraham about the 
“present” meaning of “action at law”, it seems that it does not even 
need the historical test.  As Wittgenstein famously observed,  “a 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not 
part of the mechanism.”112 Apparently, the court views itself as 
having the power to simply decree the present meaning of “action 
at law,” based upon whatever its own philosophical intuitions 
dictate as to which statutory causes of action ought to have jury trials, 
despite what the Legislature might or might not think.
Presumably, the court would even have the power to declare that 
the term “action at law” should, on contemporary philosophical 
grounds, be construed as semantically including even “equitable” 
actions, a ruling that would obliterate the traditional distinction 
between law and equity.
But if the semantical content of words in constitutional texts 
can vary as the court grasps them, with the philosophical and 
political exigencies of the moment, then why not?  After all, words 
are nothing but syntactic types semantically tied to particular
meanings.  The words, understood as syntactic types, can persist 
over time, while their associated meanings can vary.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that in Abraham the court tried to simultaneously 
use both originalist and non-originalist methods of constitutional 
interpretation and that it formulated and applied a complicated 
112. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, ¶ 271 at 95e
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., The Macmillan Company, 2d ed. 1968).
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historical test to bridge the apparent gap.  I have also argued that 
because the gap is not only apparent, but real, it cannot be bridged 
by any device, no matter how legally sophisticated.  Originalist and 
non-originalist methods are mutually exclusive as a matter of logic.
As for the historical test, I would recommend that the court discard 
it.  So far as I can see, it just gets in the way, frustrating any effort to 
decide cases on a transparent basis.  Once free of the historical test, 
the court would be free to choose such publicly clear and
transparent methods of deciding constitutional issues.  On the one 
hand, it could choose to explicitly adopt an originalist approach 
and publicly abandon any recourse to non-originalist methods.  On 
the other, it could publicly adopt a non-originalist approach and 
ignore the history.
In terms of the question presented in Abraham, the court 
would have the opportunity of explicitly choosing between two very 
different formulations of the constitutional issue: [1] Does the jury-
trial provision of the Minnesota Constitution, as intended by its 
framers in 1857, require jury trials for claims brought under the 
Whistleblower Act? [2] Do contemporary philosophical, political, 
and ideological considerations, as evaluated by the court, prove
that it would be desirable to provide for jury trials for claims 
brought under the Whistleblower Act?  Either formulation would 
constitute an important step in the direction of deciding the case 
on the basis of publicly clear and transparent grounds.
The gain for both the public and the court would be increased 
clarity.  In my view, everyone ought to be able to agree upon at 
least one proposition - a necessary condition for a healthy
democracy is clear and transparent governmental operations.
There could never be sufficiently strong reasons for disguising the 
ways in which governmental power is actually wielded.  If the courts 
are not making it up as they go along, the public has a right to 
know that.  If they are, the public has a right to know that too.
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